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Naval Historical Society of Australia

Preserving Australia's Naval History

The HMAS Melbourne-Voyager Collision: A Tragedy that Damaged and Reformed

A.N. Other · Dec 28, 2016 · Print This Page

By MIDN Mollie Burns, RAN – NEOC 54 Naval Historical Society Prizewinning Essay

Introduction

The collision of HMAS Melbourne  and HMAS Voyager  remains the Royal Australian Navy’s (RAN) worst peacetime disaster. Occurring off the New South Wales coast in 1964, the aircraft carrier Melbourne  and destroyer Voyager  were engaged in night flying exercises when Voyager  inexplicably turned in front of Melbourne ’s bow. The destroyer was cut in half and sank; of a company of three hundred and fourteen, eighty two men were killed (Spicer 1964). For the flagship and escort to collide in home waters and calm conditions with such heavy loss of life shocked the RAN and Australia.

The collision heavily damaged trust in the RAN and its standing with the Government and Australian public. Two Royal Commissions were convened over the incident, however, the investigations were poorly handled and compounded the detrimental effects of the incident.

The collision and its aftermath is of massive significance to the RAN and eventually led to large training, operational and cultural changes. This essay examines the impact such serious incidents have on the public and parliamentary perception of the RAN, and the impact it had internally. It also reviews improvements to Officer of the Watch (OOW) standards, Command Team training and operational procedures.

Impacts on the RAN’s Reputation

Serious maritime/naval accidents can cause immense damage to the public and government perception of the RAN and the trust placed within the organisation. This damage comes from various sources.

Faith in the RAN’s competency is lessened when serious incidents occur. A key factor is what errors, failings or lack of knowledge may have led to the event. This has widespread implications up to the international level; a finding of negligence would impact standing with allied naval forces.

Secondly the handling of the incident affects public perception. This involves how information is communicated immediately after the incident, the transparency of the investigation process and any actions taken as a result.

Finally, the RAN is judged on the manner in which it treats individuals involved. This includes post-incident care and ensuring a fair review process for members.

Even prior to the collision, the RAN was under increasing public and parliamentary scrutiny (Frame 1992). The service was balancing multiple goals, struggling to define its organisation and role in post-war Australia and had suffered multiple serious incidents.

The RAN was compromising between several constraints and aims. Firstly, the fleet had been in material decline since the Second World War and was aging rapidly (Frame 1992). Whilst rising tensions in Indonesia had resulted in some investment, it was also forcing ships through rapid work–up exercises such as those Melbourne and Voyager were engaged in (Frame 1992). In addition, Frame (1992) states the RAN was under pressure to prove herself to the two major allies, the Royal Navy and United States Navy. Finally, questions were being raised in Australia about the role and relevance of the RAN.

The RAN had not assisted itself in responding to these queries by becoming an increasingly insular organisation (Frame 2005). The ‘silent service’ was still a very British institution, particularly in the officer branch. Inherited traditions shaped the culture and young adolescent officers were indoctrinated into the naval way of thinking and acting during their four year education at the Royal Australian Naval College. More advanced training was generally undertaken at similar British institutions. Consequently, RAN officers were very familiar with naval practices but less so with civilian procedures. The Navy itself was primarily directed by the increasingly powerful Naval Board (Frame 1992). Frame (1992) highlights the separation of the RAN from government; independence the RAN viewed as strength. However this clear divide between RAN leadership and government led to RAN officers and the Navy being viewed as arrogant and unwilling to accept external review (Frame 1992).

The harshest scrutiny, however, arose from a series of escalating incidents and the associated fatalities (Frame 2005). This culminated in 1963 with the drowning of five junior officers who were sent on a twelve hour, out–of–sight sailing exercise in dubious weather (Frame 1992). While the Captain involved was initially convicted at the resulting court martial, this was overturned by the Naval Board who effectively sent the Captain on a promotion course (Frame 1992). The lack of accountability and action by the RAN disgusted Parliament and the public. Trust in the organisation and its self–management was quickly eroding.

Into this environment, the Melbourne – Voyager  collision stunned Australia and further damaged the failing reputation of the RAN. That one RAN ship could effectively slice another in half with such a loss of life in home waters during peacetime was shocking (Four Corners, ABC Television, 10 February 1992). Furthermore, these deaths were not ‘a sacrifice for the country’s defence … [but resulted] from human error or negligence’ (Frame 1992).

The consequential falls in recruiting demonstrated the lack of faith in the RAN (Frame 1992). Despite a heavy recruiting campaign commencing almost immediately after the incident, numbers were significantly lower and did not recover for several years indicating the persistent nature of the damage to the RAN’s reputation (Frame 1992).

The negative perceptions of the RAN and their longevity were compounded by the handling of the collision.

While the RAN expected a Naval Board of Inquiry, public and parliamentary mistrust, frustration at the information flow and the need for an impartial review resulted in a Royal Commission being convened (Frame 1992).

The Commission was characterised by a hostile approach to witnesses and the initial report is poorly regarded (Frame 1992). It highlights the unsuitability of a Commission as means of investigation and lack of naval knowledge held by the civilian investigators (Frame 1992, Ferry 2014). It also contentiously held Melbourne’s Command Team partially responsible for failing to prevent the collision, leading to the Captain’s resignation (Spicer 1964). , a finding overturned in the second Royal Commission after the resignation of the Captain involved (Hall 1982).

The second Royal Commission was driven by parliamentary backbench campaigning against a reluctant Government and Naval Board (McCarthy 2015). It overturned the Melbourne finding but, again, was unable to determine the cause (Hall 1982). Both investigations were drawn out, controversial and a source of additional pain (Frame 2005).

Internal relationships within the RAN were also damaged by the treatment of members involved.

Voyager survivors, who had been through a horrific experience, lost the ship that they lived aboard and any possessions, were granted a week of leave to return home before being posted to a sister ship (Four Corners, ABC Television, 10 February 1982). There was minimal post-collision mental care or recognition of trauma. In later years, many compensation cases were raised and, since 1964, the RAN has improved greatly in this field (Anderson 1993).

Tension also arose from the treatment of members during the investigations, particularly the Melbourne Command Team. They were viewed as scapegoats and the Naval Board was seen to have abandoned or sacrificed its members (Hall 1982). This view was compounded by Captain Robertson’s resignation and Hall (1982) describes the tension caused within the mid-officer ranks.

As with any serious maritime/naval accident, the Melbourne-Voyager collision significantly damaged the RAN. It also highlighted numerous deficiencies, particularly those occurring on the ship’s bridge, and forced critical review and improvement.

Impacts on OOW standards and Command Team training

When Melbourne  and Voyager  collided, both bridges were manned by their respective Captains, navigators, OOW and various lookouts. Whilst the exact cause of the collision has never been determined, it is clear there were multiple failings on one or both bridges.

Oxenbould (2004) asserts that the insufficient lookout on Voyager , criticised in both Commissions, was the main reason the ‘collision was not prevented’. Voyager’s  most experienced watchkeeper was absent, their OOW was inexperienced and the key lookout was on his first sea voyage (Oxenbould 2004). Furthermore, Oxenbould (2004) argues the inexperience of the both bridge teams in working together on their respective ships also contributed. On that night, Captain Stevens aboard Voyager  was the only “old hand” on either Command Team (Frame 1992). Every other officer had been recently posted onto Melbourne  or Voyager  and this was their first night at sea in company in over five months (Oxenbould 2004). It is likely this inexperience and unfamiliarity contributed in some way to the collision. Hence, while the primary cause can only be speculated on, the collision had clear implications for the standards of the OOW and Command Team training and preparation.

A range of measures were introduced after the collision to address the deficiencies that became evident.

There was a lack of formal qualifications for an OOW on given platforms and different evolutions, and no measure of their experience, platform training and currency (Ferry 2014). Objective platform qualification and periodic retesting combined with the use of advancing technology in the Bridge Simulator have greatly improved OOW training (Oxenbould 2004). Complex evolutions can now be simulated for practice and the ‘inexperienced [who] must gain experience’ (Spicer 1964) can first do so in simulated settings.

Furthermore, alterations to workups ensure they are of structured to progressively build up; close-quarters night flying exercises would not occur on directly after a long refit with new command teams (Oxenbould 2004). Such exercises would be practiced in the daylight hours initially after graduation from simpler manoeuvres; from this perspective the Melbourne-Voyager exercise program has little apparent preparation and seems overly ambitious.

Independent trials and tests are also conducted before operational workups to assess basic drills and safety procedures (Oxenbould 2004). Following any major change in Command Team, such drills are conducted before a ship goes to sea to ensure cohesion, competency and efficiency on the bridge (Oxenbould 2004).

Operational and Procedural Changes

In addition to improved OOW and Command Team training, practices relating to communications, escort ships and rescues were refined.

In regard to ship-to-ship communications, speculation that the collision may have been caused by misinterpreted signals resulted in the confirmation of ambiguous signals being encouraged (Frame 1992). Quick challenges were made mandatory if a ship’s course was not understood or caused concern (Oxenbould 2004). Ships conducting similar evolutions were also to be assisted from their Operations Room, something that did not occur on the night (Ferry 2014).

Furthermore, rigid regulations for operating with Melbourne  were released (Hall 1982). For example, a clear zone was established 2000 yards ahead of the carrier which escorts were not to enter without express permission and turns toward Melbourne  to take up station were prohibited (Oxenbould 2004).

Safety and rescue also became a higher priority; on the night, poor swimming ability likely led to several deaths and helicopter rescue was underused (Ferry 2014). Furthermore, some escape hatches on Voyager failed to open and lifejackets were not readily available (Chapman 1979). The RAN swimming standards were raised in response and escape and rescue procedures strengthened and practised (Ferry 2014).

Cultural Significances

In addition to procedural changes, the collision eventually forced the somewhat-reluctant RAN through positive cultural change (Chapman 1979). Safety, constant improvement and professional discipline became key goals.

Improvements in Command Team training also shifted the responsibilities of the Captain and surrounding officers. Whereas previously a Captain was rarely questioned and had almost autonomous power, all members of the bridge were encouraged to raise any concerns (Ferry 2014). Similarly, Captains were under more stringent medical reviews (Frame 1992). The Captain did not lose responsibility, but was more accountable and supporting members were empowered.

This was only one aspect of the significant cultural change the RAN underwent. Prior to the collision, the RAN was relatively isolated and self-contained; this led to a glaring cultural clash during the Royal Commissions (Frame 2005). The RAN officers lacked knowledge of the process, deferred to rank and honour while failing to raise key points and were often naïve in the face of a hostile investigation (Hall 1982). The need for the RAN to have stronger relationships with government and be more aware of civilian processes was evident. It would also need to become accustomed to external reviews. In building these connections, the RAN became a more open and transparent organisation with greater public and parliamentary accountability.

The Melbourne-Voyager  collision is one of the RAN’s most devastating disasters. For so many men to be killed in a training exercise severely damaged the RAN’s standing with the Australian Government and public. It also highlighted numerous weaknesses and OOW standards, Command Team training and operational procedures were improved as a result.

The collision also spurred the inertial RAN through significant cultural change with an increased focus on safety and the correct following of procedures. These reforms eventually led to the RAN becoming a more open and accountable organisation. Whilst the collision itself is one of the service’s most damaging events, it and the resulting alterations laid the foundations for many practices of the modern RAN.

Bibliography:

Anderson, D., 1993, The Voyager disaster: a 30 year saga, Issues brief number 6, Parliamentary Research Service, Canberra.

Chapman, A.I., 1979, The ‘Melbourne’ collisions: ‘Voyager’, 10th February 1964, ‘Frank E. Evans’, 3rd June 1969, a treatise of analysis and opinion, Department of Defence, Canberra.

Ferry, D., 2014, HMAS Melbourne/Voyager collision: cause theories and inquiries (with aspects of the HMAS Melbourne/USS Frank E. Evans collision), Headmark, 151, p 2-16.

Frame, T., 1992, Where Fate Calls : the HMAS Voyager tragedy, Hodder & Stoughton, Sydney.

Frame, T., 2005, The Cruel Legacy: the HMAS Voyager Tragedy , Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest NSW.

Hall, T., 1982, HMAS Melbourne , Allen & Unwin, Sydney.

HMAS Voyager: the cruel legacy, 1992, Four Corners, Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC).

McCarthy, E., 2015, John Jess, Seeker of Justice: the Role of Parliament in the HMAS Voyager Tragedy , Sid Harta Publishers, Victoria.

Oxenbould, C., 2004, The Sinking of HMAS Voyager: What Happened ?, The Sydney Papers, 16 (2), p 103-110.

Spicer, J., 1964, Report of Royal Commissioner on loss of HMAS Voyager: Melbourne, 13th August 1964 , Commonwealth Government Publisher, Canberra.

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Tragedy and courage: The collision between HMAS Melbourne and HMAS Voyager

Manoeuvring ships at sea is an exacting task, one that requires skill, experience and concentration and undertaking such exercises in night time conditions adds to the risk. Fifty-seven years ago, on the night of 10 February 1964 one such exercise went horribly wrong.

The Royal Australian Navy was undertaking routine exercises off Jervis Bay on the NSW south coast and was ending the day with night flying exercises for the aircraft of the carrier HMAS Melbourne . The Daring class destroyer HMAS Voyager (sister ship to the museum’s Vampire ) was in the role of plane guard, or rescue destroyer. Voyager ’s job was to pick up any airmen if the exercise went wrong and they crashed. It was also the destroyer’s job to stay clear of the aircraft carrier.

The exercises were going well until the start of the 8.40 pm manoeuvre. Melbourne ’s commanding officer Captain Robertson ordered Voyager to take its position – behind Melbourne and off to the port (left) side. At that stage Voyager was sailing just ahead of the carrier on the starboard (right) side. The vessel immediately turned to starboard as if to loop around behind the carrier into position; but then turned to port. The bridge crew on Melbourne thought it was going to turn to starboard again, undertaking a fishtail or zigzag course to slow its momentum. But by the time they realised Voyager was still turning to port – and therefore would pass in front of Melbourne – it was too late to avoid a collision.

Captain Robertson immediately ordered Melbourne full astern; Captain Stevenson ordered Voyager full ahead hard a starboard in a futile attempt to avoid each other. But the momentum and size of the carrier meant it was physically unable to slow or change course enough to avoiding hitting Voyager . And hit the destroyer it did – just aft of the bridge and slicing Voyager in two. The senior officers on the bridge of HMAS Voyager were killed on impact.

Within seconds Captain Robertson had ordered boats into the water, nets over the side of the carrier for survivors to clamber up and helicopters into the air. In this state of confusion, darkness and panic training swung into place and true heroes were made. The bow of Voyager had heeled sharply onto its starboard side and then turned upside down. Some 60 men were in the forward cafeteria and as water poured in they tried to get out through the escape hatches – but some wouldn’t open. The senior sailor of Voyager was Jonathan ‘Buck’ Rogers and he took control of the situation, sending sailors to hatches that would open and trying to open the jammed ones. When he realised that it was too late he was heard leading the men in prayer. The bow section sank completely in just under 10 minutes. Meanwhile the aft section stayed afloat, sinking slowly, until just after midnight.

Of the ship’s complement of 314, 82 men were never to return home.

The survivors who were plucked from the water were covered in fuel oil, vomiting, cut, bruised, and broken and in shock. Within 15 minutes the first survivors were being taken on board the carrier. Some were taken directly to HMAS Creswell in Jervis Bay while Melbourne steamed to Sydney.

In the decades that followed, public scrutiny of private lives and naval procedures kept the tragedy in the news. There were two Royal Commissions, the first acknowledging the lack of a proper lookout and response on the part of the Voyager bridge officers but also criticising the Melbourne bridge crew for not questioning the course Voyager was taking. The second Commission exonerated the Melbourne men – too late though for Captain Robertson who had resigned from the navy – and concluded the collision was due to a mistake by Voyager and that Captain Stevenson was medically unfit for command at the time. He had been suffering from a duodenal ulcer and was at times apparently self-medicating with alcohol. As none of Voyager ’s bridge officers survived the collision we may never know why the port course was taken.

After the Royal Commissions, the Naval Board put into place a series of reforms and safety changes on board ships and reviewed many of its policies and procedures. It was also made accountable to the wider government and public community.

For many of the men of Voyager and Melbourne and their families this has been an ongoing struggle. The survivors were given seven days’ leave, replacement uniforms and vouchers to get home. And then they returned to duty and were deployed to other RAN ships. Many suffered flashbacks and nightmares, anger and alcohol issues, problems with confined spaces and obsession with safety measures. Life was never the same again. Compensation claims were initially dismissed by the High Court but this was overruled in 1982. In the 1990s both Voyager and Melbourne men and their families pursued claims against the Government in court, with the last case being closed in 2009 – 45 years after the tragedy unfolded.

The men and women of the Royal Australian Navy work and train in an exacting and dangerous environment and deserve our respect. Today we mark the worst peacetime loss for our navy – may it never happen again.

Lindsey Shaw

Formerly ANMM Senior Curator, I retired after 27 years of service in 2013 and am now Honorary Research Associate.

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Remembering the HMAS Melbourne/Voyager disaster

By Jayne Keogh, Naval Association of Australia

There are some things that you just can’t unsee. That was the case for the sailors aboard the armada of ships and aircraft dispatched to the scene of the Melbourne/Voyager collision on the night of 10 February 1964. They managed to rescue 232 of their mates, but at a terrible personal cost.

At its Monthly Ceremony on 24 February, the Naval Association of Australia wishes to highlight the service of members of the Royal Australian Navy first responders. We will commemorate crew members from HMAS Voyager (II ) (pictured) who paid the supreme sacrifice in the service of their country, and the persons who answered the call for assistance including HMA Ships Melbourne, Stuart, Hawk, Ibis, Curlew, Snipe and Teal and search and rescue (SAR) vessels from HMAS Creswell (Air Sprite and Air Nymph), air assets from Naval Air Station Nowra including Wessex and Sycamore helicopters, Gannets anti-submarine aircraft, Dakota aircraft, RAAF Neptune and HM submarine Tabard.

Their first sight was the massive hole ripped in Melbourne ’s bow, the half of Voyager still floating but sinking fast and life rafts full with shocked, injured, and deceased sailors.

This was the assault on the senses that 24-year-old Lieutenant Kerry Stephens faced when his command HMAS Air Nymph , a SAR vessel from HMAS Creswell arrived at the scene two hours after the collision. Nine minutes after the collision Kerry had answered the hotline call, hit the emergency siren and within two minutes Air Nymph was manned and heading out at 28 knots.

Defence Force personnel are highly trained to immediately shift into adrenaline overdrive in emergency situations, just to operate at maximum efficiency. It is widely acknowledged now the effects of trauma often comes later, sometimes decades later, with triggered memories accompanied by intense emotional and physical reactions.

It took Kerry 44 years to tell his story, and only after being pressured by his naval colleagues.

‘Many of the sailors swimming in the water were not wearing life jackets,’ he says. ‘Some could obviously see us as we approached, and calls were heard from groups of those in the water crying “ Over here, over here ”.

‘The survivors we pulled out were suffering shock, severe injuries and required medical treatment by our Surgeon Lieutenant on board. Most were covered in oil from their immersion in water and traumatised from the collision.

Kerry was about to go alongside the stern of the Voyager to carry out a search for anyone still onboard. However, a Chief Ordnance Artificer from the destroyer, who had been recovered from the water, said he was the last to leave the stern section and assured him that there was no-one left onboard.

‘I always worried that I should have gone alongside the stern to check for survivors, and it wasn’t until 2008 at a lunch with a Voyager survivor that my mind was laid to rest. It’s a long time to wonder if you left some to die.

‘Our crew also brooded on our actions that night. In the following days, many of them came to see me and asked if there was anything more that they could have done, and whether we missed people in the water.’

It was disappointing for Kerry that no acknowledgement, praise or thanks was ever received for what the SAR crews did that night during the rescue operations.

‘They saw many horrific things but did what they had to do, without question or hesitation,’ says Kerry. ‘They all showed initiative under extremely traumatic conditions and performed their duties above and beyond what would have been expected of sailors of their age and experience.’

It was the same for the sailors on Melbourne , whose quick actions plucked 180 souls from the water in their lifeboats. The operating theatre and sickbay were ready to receive the injured.

However, for a long time a completely unfair and untrue rumour of fault followed the Captain and crew of Melbourne. The subsequent inquiry clearly exonerated Captain Robertson and his crew. But that did not diminish the ‘survivor guilt’ and perceived stigma of being on Melbourne . Until recently few memorial services even mentioned them.

One such sailor was Bob Clarey, a very young Stoker on Melbourne who was catching some night air on a break with a mate, sitting on the superstructure behind the funnel. This gave him a bird’s eye view of the whole accident. After ‘action stations’ was called, Bob scrambled to the deck and spent the next few hours getting the survivors ready for medical attention.

‘I remember the collision, it replays in my mind in nightmares, but I have no recollection of the two weeks I spent in the Balmoral Naval Hospital afterwards, where I was being psychologically assessed for what they called battle fatigue.’

Bob was just 16 years of age, a junior recruit. He never had his career in the Navy, leaving after 18 months due to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).

‘We had no counselling, thanks or recognition of our role that night. For years we were thought of as the bad guys of the Navy who had caused the accident.’

Only recently the crew of Melbourne were included in Voyager ceremonies which Bob has attended at St Marys at Kangaroo Point at the memorial to the tragedy. ‘I feel compelled to go, but it brings it all back to me – it’s a meltdown.’

Two Naval Association members, John King and Noel Chidley were called out on the minesweeper HMAS Ibis from Jervis Bay.

‘We went out and back three times that night, only finishing at 1030 the next morning,’ says Noel. ‘On one trip we could only travel at four knots as we were escorting the admiral’s barge which had men so badly injured that they couldn’t be moved, some not expected to make it. One sailor was missing an arm. Every time there is a shipping accident in the news, I have flashbacks, all bathed in that eerie green from the spotlights we set up on deck to look for men in the water.’

‘It is my hope that if those who are still alive read this article, they can be assured that the exceptional way they all performed their duties will never be forgotten,’ says Kerry.

A short ceremony is held at 10.30am on the last Thursday of every month at the Jack Tar statue in the South Brisbane Memorial Park. At each ceremony, a guest from the relevant part of the RAN tells their story in front of veterans, serving RAN personnel, descendants, and the general public.

This month, we will commemorate the Melbourne/Voyager disaster on Thursday 24 February. All welcome.

For more information: Jayne Keogh 0418 882 408 / naaqldmedia [at] outlook.com (naaqldmedia[at]outlook[dot]com) .

For anyone impacted by this article, support is available at Open Arms – Veterans & Families Counselling service. Open Arms has a range of specialised trauma-informed, military aware services, including counselling and group programs. Call 1800 011 146 for free and confidential support or visit www.openarms.gov.au

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The HMAS Melbourne-HMAS Voyager Collision: Australia’s Worst Peace-Time Naval Disaster

Nicholas egan.

On the 10th of February 1964 a terrible naval accident took place in Australian waters that led to 82 deaths. Off the coast of the Royal Australian Navy base at Jervis Bay, the aircraft carrier, the HMAS Melbourne and the destroyer, the HMAS Voyager were conducting maneuvers when it soon became clear that the 2 ships were heading for collision. Both crews desperately tried to change course, but it was too late.

HMAS Melbourne struck Voyager at 20:56, with the carrier's bow striking just behind the bridge and cutting the destroyer in two. Of the 314 aboard Voyager, 82 were killed, most of whom died immediately or were trapped in the heavy bow section, which sank after 10 minutes. The rest of the ship sank after midnight. Melbourne, although damaged, suffered no fatalities, and was able to sail to Sydney the next morning with most of the Voyager survivors aboard. The loss of the Voyager ranks as the 6th most deadly loss of life in Australian navy history.[i]

The incident shocked the public and memorial services were held around Australia on 21 February. Public distrust in navy led inquiries over the previous few decades resulted in a Royal Commission being called to investigate the cause of the disaster. The commission, led by former Attorney General Sir John Spicer, concluded that the collision was primarily the fault of Voyager's bridge crew, in that they neglected to maintain an effective lookout and lost awareness of the carrier's location, although he did not blame individual officers. When reporting on the contribution of Melbourne and those aboard her to the collision, Spicer specifically indicated failures of its captain John Robertson and two other bridge officers, as they did not alert Voyager to the danger she was in, and appeared to not take measures to prevent Melbourne from colliding. Robertson submitted his resignation from the Navy and was considered to be a scapegoat by the media.[ii]

Over the next few years there was increasing pressure from the public, the media, and politicians of the government and opposition over the handling of the first Royal Commission, as well as claims made by Lieutenant Commander Peter Cabban, a former officer of the Voyager, that Captain Duncan Stevens frequently drank to excess and was unfit for command. Eventually in 1967, Prime Minister Harold Holt announced that a second Royal Commission would be held.

The second Royal Commission found that Stevens was medically unfit for command, although not impaired by alcohol at the time of the collision, he was suffering from a duodenal ulcer and had been confidentially prescribed amphetamines. Consequently, some of the findings of the first commission, those based on the assumption that Voyager was under appropriate command, were re-evaluated. Robertson and the other officers of Melbourne were absolved of blame for the incident.

In the aftermath of the disaster, Chief Petty Officer Jonathan 'Buck' Rogers was posthumously awarded the George Cross for his actions during the sinking. Recognizing that he was too large to fit through the escape hatch, he organised the evacuation of those who could escape, then led those stuck in the compartment in prayers and hymns as they died. Posthumous Albert Medals for Lifesaving were awarded to Midshipman Kerry Marien and Electrical Mechanic William Condon for their actions in saving other Voyager personnel at the cost of their own lives.[iii]

5 Years later, the HMAS Melbourne was tragically involved in a second naval disaster, this time with the American Destroyer USS Frank E. Evans in the South China Sea. Evans sailed under Melbourne's bow, where she was cut in two. 74 of Evans's crew were killed.

A joint RAN–USN board of inquiry was held to establish the events of the collision and the responsibility of those involved. This inquiry, which was believed by the Australians to be biased against them, found that both ships were at fault for the collision. Four officers (the captains of Melbourne and Evans, and the two junior officers in control of Evans at the time of the collision) were court-martialed based on the results of the inquiry; while the three USN officers were found guilty, the RAN officer was cleared of wrongdoing.[iv]

There are a number of memorials to those who were killed in both tragedies. In Jervis Bay stands a memorial to the HMAS Voyager and in Gurnee, Illinois stands a memorial to those who were lost in the USS Frank E. Evans disaster.

USS Frank E. Evans memorial located in Warren Cemetery, Gurnee, Illinois. Wikimedia Commons Author: GoodSam111 https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:USFEE_memorial_large_tablet.jpg

References [i] Frame, Tom (2005). The Cruel Legacy: the HMAS Voyager tragedy. Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin. ISBN 1-74115-254-2. OCLC 61213421. [ii] Spicer, Sir John Armstrong (1964). Report of Royal Commissioner on loss of H.M.A.S. "Voyager" (Report). https://trove.nla.gov.au/version/46252538 Melbourne: A.J. Arthur, Commonwealth Govt. Printer. [iii] Burbury; Asprey & Lucas (1 March 1968). "Royal Commissioners' Report on Voyager Inquiry" (PDF). http://www.navy.gov.au/sites/default/files/documen... Navy News. Vol. 11, no. 5. Parramatta: Cumberland Newspapers Pty Ltd. [iv] Stevenson, Jo (1999). In The Wake: The true story of the Melbourne-Evans Collision, Conspiracy and Cover-up. Alexandria, NSW: Hale & Iremonger. ISBN 0-86806-681-8. (Author Jo Stevenson was the wife of Captain John Phillip Stevenson, the Commanding Officer of Melbourne at the time of the collision)

John Jess MP fought for justice for dead and living following HMAS Voyager tragedy

A NEW book details the greatest political and military cover-up in Australian history — the HMAS Voyager disaster.

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NUMEROUS books and documentaries and millions of words have been written about the HMAS Voyager tragedy on February 10, 1964 that claimed 82 lives, but none has detailed the political bastardry around Australia’s worst peacetime naval disaster like ‘John Jess Seeker of Justice’.

The terms ‘cover-up’ and ‘white wash’ don’t come close to doing justice to the loathsome performance of the nation’s political elites from then Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies down or the Royal Australian Navy and its desire to protect its reputation regardless of the human cost or the risk of history repeating itself.

Sadly in the case of HMAS Melbourne that is exactly what happened when she collided with the US Navy destroyer Frank E. Evans in June 1969 with the loss of 74 lives.

John Jess was the Victorian Liberal MP who rocked the establishment to its very foundations with his eight-year quest for the truth about how the navy’s flagship, the light aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne, came to slice the destroyer escort HMAS Voyager in half off the NSW south coast with the loss of 82 men.

Here was that very rare breed of backbench politician willing to sacrifice his own ambition in the fight for justice.

His story is all too rare and his daughter Elizabeth McCarthy has spent 10 years tracing her father’s footsteps and meticulously researching a book that shines a light into the darkest corners of political and military intrigue.

“I set out to write my father’s biography, but that story was dominated by the Voyager tragedy and the need to see my father receive the recognition he deserves,” Ms McCarthy said.

Mr Jess’s wife Joy (nee Smart) was a cousin of the man most damaged by the Voyager ‘cover-up’, the Commanding Officer of HMAS Melbourne Captain John Robertson.

According to the book, Captain Robertson was reluctant to support John Jess in his quest for justice for 82 dead men and the survivors whose reputations were mulched by the establishment, but the Member for Latrobe would not be deterred.

Ms McCarthy has delved deep into the archives and into her late father’s personal papers to produce a story that puts the sword to any notions of honour when governments’ decide that the truth is too unpalatable for the punters to bear or too risky for them.

Mr Jess drew parallels between his own government’s actions over Voyager and George Orwell’s timeless tale ‘1984’ and the victimisation of the small man by powerful political elites.

In 1964, none was more powerful than Sir Robert Menzies and Ms McCarthy strongly argues that Menzies was the architect of one of the greatest cover-ups in Australian history.

Not only did the great ‘Ming’ establish a biased Royal Commission that mercilessly flayed Captain Robertson, but he refused to allow Jess to present fresh evidence about the serious medical condition of the Voyager’s skipper Captain Duncan Stevens who suffered from serious duodenal ulcers.

A later Royal Commission in 1967 dealt with the Stevens health issue in more detail, including his alcoholism, but even that second inquiry was deeply flawed.

It did clear Captain Robertson and his fellow officers Commander James Kelly and Alex Bate, but it sacrificed the reputation of key whistle blower Commander Peter Cabban whose statement to Jess about the performance of Captain Stevens was crucial to the outcome.

Speaking in Parliament about the second Voyager inquiry Mr Jess said, “A question of justice in this country and what justice means in this country and whether justice is based on fact and whether fair and open inquiries are worth fighting for.”

Elizabeth McCarthy said Menzies and the Navy’s top brass knew all the facts about Stevens’ poor health, but still they scapegoated Captain Robertson and sought to blame Melbourne for the disaster.

“They knew that Stevens was unfit to command,” she said.

Ms McCarthy said it was time to stand up and to correct the record for the living and the dead.

“It is time for both crews to be cleared of any blame.”

She said her father, who died in 2003, described the Voyager Royal Commission as the greatest injustice to service personnel in Australian history.

After reading the John Jess story there is little reason to doubt him.

• John Jess Seeker of Justice by Elizabeth McCarthy, published by Sid Harta Publishers, RRP $29.95.

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A music festival that boasted international artists has been cancelled just five days after tickets went on sale.

The two men who died while swimming at a popular waterfall had been studying in Australia.

The family of an Australian couple who were brutally killed in their hotel room in The Philippines have said everyday is a ‘nightmare’.

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FAA investigating after video shows jetliner aborting landing on same runway as departing plane

By Emily Mae Czachor

July 10, 2024 / 11:26 AM EDT / CBS News

The Federal Aviation Administration has launched an investigation after two planes from major commercial airlines appeared to nearly collide mid-air in an unnerving dash camera video taken by police in Syracuse, New York, this week. Although experts say the flights were not actually on a collision course, based on preliminary evidence, they were for a time flying in very close proximity — just 725 feet apart at their nearest point.

The incident happened at around 11:50 a.m. EDT on Monday, officials said, as the two regional jets navigated around an apparent traffic control error that initially had one cleared to depart from Syracuse Hancock International Airport at the same the other was cleared to land on the same runway. 

Audio of Air Traffic Control's communication with the pilots on both flights indicates that the controller initially gave a green light for landing to American Eagle Flight 5511, a Bombardier CRJ-700 jet operated by PSA Airlines, a regional branch of American Airlines. The controller then gave another go-ahead for departure from runway 28 — the same runway designated for the American plane — to Delta Connection 5421, another CRJ-700 operated by Endeavor Air, which is a regional branch of Delta. 

At that point, a pilot on the American flight was heard in the audio, asking, "Wait, who's cleared to take off on 28?" 

Traffic control responded to the American pilot with instructions to abort the landing and "go around," which the pilot followed. But flight radar data showed that the plane, while climbing to an altitude of around 1,825 feet, continued on a path that ultimately led it over the runway from which the Delta flight was taking off. As the Delta plane left the ground and itself climbed upward, there was a moment when it flew beneath the American plane flying 725 feet above. 

The American flight turned, descending slightly, so that it was about 675 feet above the Delta plane, but, by then, also 425 feet off of its path. This may have been the time where a North Syracuse Police Department vehicle caught a glimpse of the planes on its dash camera. From a distance, it looked like they were seconds from slamming into each other.

Delta confirmed that there were 76 passengers and four crew members, including two pilots and two flight attendants, on board Flight 5421, which was headed to New York City. American said its Flight 5511, from Washington, D.C., was carrying 75 passengers and four crew members. No one was hurt in the ordeal.

The FAA said it was investigating the incident and what may have led up to it. In a statement to CBS News, Delta said, "Endeavor Air and Delta will work with aviation authorities as we always do in our shared commitment to safety above all else." American Airlines confirmed that the incident happened but declined to comment and deferred to the FAA probe.

In addition to other seemingly close calls on major runways , numerous headline-making air travel incidents that emerged in recent years — a Boeing plane emergency landing in January after losing a door plug mid-flight is just one example — have turned a renewed focus toward aircraft safety. Despite that, the FAA said that cases like the one in Syracuse on Monday are actually declining. In the first five months of 2024, the rate of serious runway incursions dropped by 68% compared with the same period in 2023, according to FAA data. 

CBS News Senior Transportation Correspondent Kris Van Cleave contributed reporting.

• American Airlines
• Delta Air Lines

Emily Mae Czachor is a reporter and news editor at CBSNews.com. She covers breaking news, often focusing on crime and extreme weather. Emily Mae has previously written for outlets including the Los Angeles Times, BuzzFeed and Newsweek.

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Brightline collisions, fatalities raise concerns in Melbourne

Latest brightline-related fatality raises questions; wednesday's melbourne collision left 62-year-old man dead.

For months, Melbourne police and other officials have warned the public about the daily passages of Brightline's high-speed trains through downtown and other densely populated areas along the railroad tracks.

Those warnings were voiced again Wednesday after a Honda Element sports utility vehicle rolled into the path of the northbound, privately owned passenger train, killing a 62-year-old man and badly injuring three others, police reported.

The mangled wreckage of the SUV could be seen lying on its side, just north of the Jackson Street crossing where the 2 p.m. collision took place, as police, forensic agents and firefighters arrived.

The body of the driver, identified by police as Charles "Chuck" Phillips of Melbourne, was turned over to the medical examiner's office in Rockledge. The injured passengers were named by police as 48-year-old Keisha Gonzalez of Melbourne, 44-year-old Terricha Culbreth of Palm Bay and a 9-year-old unnamed child from Palm Bay.

"Everything is still under investigation at this moment," said Sgt. Ben Slover, spokesperson with the Melbourne Police Department. The agency is looking into several factors, including whether there were any malfunctions involving railroad equipment and whether the driver saw the oncoming train in time or was distracted.

It was the third fatal crash in Brevard involving Brightline, whose trains run between Orlando and Miami, in three months.

The latest collision happened behind the American Legion building at Jackson Street near U.S. 1, where railroad crossing arms are present before the train moves through. Melbourne police roped off much of the area and were conducting an investigation.

More: Brightline train, SUV collide in south Melbourne, 1 dead, 3 injured

A spokesperson for the rail line did not immediately return multiple calls from FLORIDA TODAY. No statements were issued by the company as of early Thursday afternoon.

Melbourne police and other agencies have warned residents and motorists about the frequency and speed of the newly launched passenger line that connects Miami to Orlando. Signs have been posted about the train and the impact on traffic.

Marcus Smith is the first vice president of American Legion 191, a post located just yards from the railroad tracks.

He said the deadly collisions and other questions may merit a fresh look at addressing whether even more safety features can be implemented for residents.

"The reality is that these things are a part of the world we live in," said Smith, who is running for Seat 1 on Melbourne's city council.

"My big concern is educating folks to try to be safer. The trains are here now and you can't stop them. But we have to do more to ensure the safety of people. It may come down to getting the trains to sound their horns more or send alerts that the trains are coming down, using 21st-century technology to reach people."

Brightline utilizes the north-south tracks that run through a densely populated portion of the city, including the downtown area.

Mayor Paul Alfrey pointed out just after the collision that a number of safety features have been put into place by Brightline and that the city has worked to inform the public about the train, its speed and schedule.

“There are safety precautions but we’re seeing in some cases where people aren’t following them. I’m not sure of the details of this case but in general, no one wins against the train,” said Alfrey, who said he would be conferring with the city manager about the incidents.

“We need people to abide by the safety features. The train is here regardless of whether any of us like it or not.”

The previous crash took place Christmas Eve along the railroad tracks that cut across Aurora Road, leaving a 36-year-old pedestrian dead. That site was not too far from the location where a 60-year-old woman was struck and killed by a Brightline train on Oct. 19, police reported. No conclusions have been made in either the October incident or the one on Christmas Eve, Slover said.

TCPalm reported in October 2023 that at least 364 people have been  killed by trains  belonging to 13 different companies in Florida since 2017. Brightline trains killed more people per mile in the U.S. last year and more people in Florida since its founding in 2017 than any other railroad company, a TCPalm analysis of federal data found. Since October, at least 104 people have been killed in collisions with Brightline trains nationwide, reports show.

"People really need to be very mindful of there whereabouts. Those railway arms are down for a reason," said City Councilmember Yvonne Minus, who was at the scene moments after the collision on Wednesday.

An investigation into the deadly crashes in Melbourne is ongoing.

J.D. Gallop  is a criminal justice/breaking news reporter at FLORIDA TODAY. Contact Gallop at 321-917-4641 or  [email protected] . Twitter:  @JDGallop.

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Sergei Ryakhovsky

The balashikha ripper, the hippopotamus,   active for 6 years (1988-1993) in russia, confirmed victims, possible victims.

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Sergei Ryakhovsky (Sergei Vasilyevich Ryakhovsky) a Soviet-Russian serial killer known as the Balashikha Ripper and The Hippopotamus. Ryakhovsky was convicted for the killing of nineteen people in the Moscow area between 1988 and 1993. Ryakhovsky's mainly stabbed or strangulated his victims, he mutilated some bodies, mainly in the genital area. Allegedly Ryakhovsky carried out necrophilic acts on his victims and stole their belongings. Ryakhovsky standing 6’5" tall and weighting 286 pounds, gaining him the nickname, The Hippo. Sergei Ryakhovsky died on January 21st 2005 from untreated tuberculosis while serving his life sentence in prison.

Sergei Ryakhovsky Serial Killer Profile

Serial Killer Sergei Ryakhovsky (aka) the Balashikha Ripper, The Hippopotamus, was active for 6 years between 1988-1993 , known to have ( 19 confirmed / 19 possible ) victims. This serial killer was active in the following countries: Russia

Sergei Ryakhovsky was born on December 29th 1962 in Balashikha, Moscow Oblast, Soviet Union. He had a physically defect. During his education he had academic, social or discipline problems including being teased or picked on.

Sergei Ryakhovsky a necrophile male citizen of Russia.

Prior to his spree he had killed, commited crimes, and served time in jail.

In 1988 (Age 25/26) Sergei Ryakhovsky started his killing spree, during his crimes as a serial killer he was known to rob, commit acts of necrophilia , torture , strangle , rape , mutilate, and murder his victims.

He was arrested on April 13th 1993 (Age 30), sentenced to death by firing squad at a maximum-security penal colony in Solikamsk, Perm Oblast, Russia. He was convicted on charges of murder and other possible charges during his lifetime.

Sergei Ryakhovsky died on January 21st 2005 (Age 42), cause of death: natural causes, untreated tuberculosis at a maximum-security penal colony in Solikamsk, Perm Oblast, Russia.

Profile Completeness: 62%

Sergei Ryakhovsky has been listed on Killer.Cloud since November of 2016 and was last updated 5 years ago.

Sergei Ryakhovsky a known:

( 651 killers ) serial killer.

The unlawful killing of two or more victims by the same offender(s), in separate events. Serial Killer as defined by the FBI at the 2005 symposium.

( 308 killers ) RAPIST

Rape is usually defined as having sexual intercourse with a person who does not want to, or cannot consent.

( 60 killers ) NECROPHILIAC

Necrophilia, also called thanatophilia, is a sexual attraction or sexual act involving corpses. Serial Killer Necrophiliacs have been known to have sex with the body of their victim(s).

( 89 killers ) TORTURER

Torture is when someone puts another person in pain. This pain may be physical or psychological. Tourturers touture their victims.

( 251 killers ) STRANGLER

Strangulation is death by compressing the neck until the supply of oxygen is cut off. Stranglers kill by Strangulation.

Sergei Ryakhovsky Serial Killer Profile:

Updated: 2019-06-30 collected by killer.cloud, 8 timeline events of serial killer sergei ryakhovsky.

The 8 dates listed below represent a timeline of the life and crimes of serial killer Sergei Ryakhovsky. A complete collection of serial killer events can be found on our Serial Killer Timeline .

Back to top Serial Killers Active During

The following serial killers were active during the same time span as Sergei Ryakhovsky (1988-1993).

Michael Lee Lockhart 3 Victims during 2 Years

Robert browne 2 victims during 26 years, jozef slovak 5 victims during 14 years, gary ridgway 49 victims during 19 years, serial killers by active year, books that mention sergei ryakhovsky.

Kevin Smith

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Butterfly skin.

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Believing in russia.

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Freedom of religion or belief. anti-sect move....

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External References

• Sergei Ryakhovsky on en.wikipedia.org , Retrieved on Sep 18, 2018 .
• Juan Ignacio Blanco , Sergei Vasilyevich RYAKHOVSKY on murderpedia.org , Retrieved on Sep 18, 2018 .
• Q372816 on www.wikidata.org , Retrieved on Oct 9, 2018 .

Sergei Ryakhovsky is included in the following pages on Killer.Cloud the Serial Killer Database

• #3 of 45[ Page 1 ] of Serial Killers with birthdays in December
• #10 of 60[ Page 1 ] of Serial Killer Necrophiliacs sorted by Confirmed Victims
• #10 of 29[ Page 1 ] of Serial Killers active in Russia
• #10 of 55[ Page 1 ] of Capricorn Serial Killers sorted by Confirmed Victims
• #11 of 89[ Page 1 ] of Serial Killer Torturers sorted by Confirmed Victims
• #27 of 250[ Page 2 ] of Serial Killer Stranglers sorted by Confirmed Victims
• #35 of 307[ Page 3 ] of Serial Killer Rapist sorted by Confirmed Victims
• #63 of 651[ Page 5 ] of serial killers sorted by Confirmed Victims
• #264 of 651[ Page 18 ] of serial killers sorted by Years Active
• #381 of 651[ Page 26 ] of serial killers sorted by Profile Completeness
• #516 of 651[ Page 35 ] of the A-Z List of Serial Killers

Teenager allegedly involved in fatal crash in Melbourne's east has bail revoked

A teen accused of driving a stolen car involved in a crash that killed a 28-year-old man has been remanded in custody after breaching his bail conditions.

The court heard the teen had a curfew requiring him to be home between 7pm and 6am, but had left home on Sunday and not returned until Tuesday night.

What's next?

The 17-year-old will remain in custody until his next court appearance.

A teenager accused of driving a stolen car involved in a fatal crash in Melbourne's east has had his bail revoked.

A children's court was told on Wednesday the 17-year-old breached two conditions of his bail, including a curfew requiring him to remain at his family home between 7pm and 6am.

The court heard the teenager left home on Sunday afternoon and didn't return until 6:30pm on Tuesday.

Police have said the 17-year-old was allegedly behind the wheel of a stolen car involved in a crash that claimed the life of 28-year-old Ashburton man William Taylor. 

Last week he was granted bail in relation to the crash. 

He has now been remanded in custody until his next court date.

Teenager fled the scene of fatal crash, court heard

The teenager faced a Melbourne court last week on numerous charges relating to the crash, including culpable driving causing death.

The court heard the boy was found in his bed just 90 minutes after the fatal incident.

Two 15-year-old girls are due to face court over the same incident later this month, charged with theft of a motor vehicle.

Anyone with information has been urged to contact Crime Stoppers on 1800 333 000.

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